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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


National Intelligence Council

29 April 1987

NOTE FOR: All NIOs

FROM: C/NIC

If you have any inputs you would like
to make in response to the attached, please
provide to Graham Fuller by noon 12 May. Thanks!


Frank B. Horton III

Attachments:

Memo to NFIB Principals
dtd 28 Apr 87

Memo from ADCI dtd 27 Apr 87

Memo to ADCI from C/NIC & VCs NIC dtd 20 Apr 87

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NFIB 89.9
28 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD PRINCIPALS

FROM: Executive Secretary, NFIB

SUBJECT: The Integrity and Objectivity of National Foreign Intelligence Estimates

1. In National Security Decision Directive Number 266, Implementation of the Recommendations of the President's Special Review Board, the President on 31 March instructed the Director of Central Intelligence to provide such additional review of, guidance for, and direction to, the conduct of national foreign intelligence estimates as may be required to maintain the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence process. The Directive further ordered the DCI to report the results of his review to the National Security Council, through the National Security Advisor, no later than 31 July 1987.

2. In pursuance of the President's Directive, Acting Director of Central Intelligence Gates requests that you provide to MGen Horton, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, via the NFIB Secretariat, your views about:


--how well the current system for producing estimates serves the maintenance of their integrity and objectivity;

--any problems you perceive that impinge on the objectivity and integrity of these products; and

--any suggestions you may have for improving the objectivity and integrity of these products.

3. Once General Horton has received your comments, he will utilize them in developing a briefing to the Board, probably to be delivered in late May. That briefing and your reactions to it will form the basis for the response the DCI will forward to the NSC.

4. Please provide your comments to the NFIB Secretariat by noon on 12 May 1987. If the Secretariat has not heard from you by that time, it will take it that you have no comments to offer.



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END OF TRANSMISSION

27 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
Chairman, National Intelligence Council


FROM: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Response to NSDD 266 on the Implementation of the
Recommendations of the Tower Commission

I have no substantive problems with your memorandum, but believe that we need a more formal process in responding to Carlucci's memorandum of March 31. Accordingly, at the next NFIB I would like to address the process for the production of National Intelligence Estimates. I would like to have General Horton briefly review the process involved from origins (tasking from policy agency or generation within the Intelligence Community) to final action on an estimate by NFIB. This description should include at each stage any interaction with policy agencies routinely encouraged as part of the estimate's process--taking into account the recommendations of the SSCI study on estimative last year--and also should detail safeguards built into the system to assure the integrity of the estimative process and the estimates themselves.

Once this presentation is complete, I would then take the floor with several points for the NFIB principals. I would like for the NIC to draft these for me but they certainly should include importance of all NFIB agencies taking advantage of their right to dissenting view, the importance of all agencies and especially the principals not being hesitant to express their concerns about the substance of estimates or any uneasiness that they have about the integrity of the process either directly to the DCI/DDCI or to the NFIB as a whole, and to ensure within their own organizations that the views of intelligence analysts are insulated from policy influences. There are other points that probably should be made as well along these lines. I then would ask for any comments by NFIB principals.

Following this, I would send a memorandum to Carlucci noting that I had convened the NFIB to discuss the integrity of the intelligence process, that the following points were made and agreed to, and that the situation will be monitored closely by the NFIB. This overall process gives a greater sense of formality and seriousness to the undertaking. It also will offer the opportunity for NFIB principals to express any concerns. The general thrust of this approach should be conveyed to the NFIB principals by the Executive Secretary as an agenda item for the next NFIB.


Robert M. Gates

cc: Executive Secretary, NFIB

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 01753-87
20 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Maj Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence CouncilH. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence CouncilGraham E. Fuller
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence CouncilSUBJECT: Response to NSDD 266 on the Implementation of the
Recommendations of the Tower Commission

1. For your consideration in responding to NSDD 266, we offer the following. The Tower Commission has emphasized the importance of the integrity of the foreign intelligence estimative process, the need for rigorous intelligence community independence and avoidance of policy advocacy. We believe the present national estimative process does for the most part successfully maintain these criteria. The estimative process has by-and-large maintained a good record of objective independence over the years, even though some Administrations--Republican and Democratic--have sometimes exerted pressures on that system to the contrary, and individual intelligence officers themselves have in some cases blurred the necessary distinction between intelligence and policy. We propose, below, some additional steps which can help to insure that there is no confusion among the multifaceted roles of the NIO which touch on both the policy and intelligence arena.

2. The many roles of the NIOs. NIOs serve in several differing capacities for the Director of Central Intelligence that relate to the issues raised by the Tower Commission Report and NSDD 266.

- a. The NIO serves as a critical link between the DCI and the policy community. Specifically, the NIO: 1) represents the DCI at selected policy meetings in providing intelligence input for the policy process; 2) keeps the DCI informed of developments within the intelligence and policy communities that relate to the

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intelligence community's work, and guides the production of timely Estimates whose facts and judgments will be relevant to known policy discussions; 3) serves to advise the DCI on policy implications of intelligence developments.

- More specifically, NIO's regularly straddle the intelligence/policymaking fence by representing the DCI at policy-formulation meetings. The NIO will brief policy representatives on the current outlook for a given country as perceived by the intelligence community and will comment on the feasibility--from an intelligence point of view--of various policy options under review.
- NIO's are also regularly asked to read off and comment on draft NSDD's on behalf of the intelligence community--again to judge the analytic portion of the policymakers'draft and to review feasibility from an intelligence point of view of policy proposals.
- Further, NIOs also meet with senior policy-level figures periodically to review those areas in which the NIO feels a "disconnect" may exist between what the intelligence prognosis is in a given situation and what the policy is trying to do.

In all these areas policymakers welcome the NIO's role in helping focus the policy-formulation process, and respect the NIO's intelligence integrity in so doing. We believe that their integrity has not been and is not being compromised, but that there are grey areas where more care must be taken to insure estimative integrity.

b. There is a broad grey area between the discussion of the feasibility of policies and direct policy advocacy. The intelligence officer has a responsibility to point out where the intelligence runs for or against policy proposals. The NIO must be rigorous in presenting intelligence perspectives in policy fora as well as directing community estimative work clearly free of any personal or institutional policy preferences. But the NIO must also be free to provide the DCI with his own views on the policy implications of ongoing events as a senior intelligence officer in his field. In the latter area we recommend the following steps to strengthen further our present procedures' insistence on objectivity, and so help eliminate any confusion among the NIOs' various roles.

- Any memos to the DCI representing the NIO's personal views should be explicitly flagged as such at the outset of the memo. This should be done in all cases, so that the authorship and purpose of the memo will be clear to any outside readers to whom the DCI may give such memos, whether or not the NIO specifically included outside addressees.

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- When these memos touch on policy issues, the NIO must rigorously avoid explicit and direct policy advocacy, i.e. urging of a single straight line policy approach. Discussions of policy should not be avoided however. NIOs need to discuss broader policy implications of intelligence developments, but should place the policy problems in as broad a light as possible. The implications of alternative policies should be objectively discussed avoiding clear-cut advocacy of any given one.
- c. Another major responsibility of the NIO is to oversee the production of National Intelligence Estimates.
- Although the NIO receives direct requests from policy agencies for production of Estimates on topics of interest to the policymakers, the NIO is not bound to rigid conformity with policymakers' tasking. While any intelligence question from policymakers should and will be answered, the NIO will place the specific policymakers' questions in the broadest possible intelligence context. In short, if the NIO believes the intelligence questions which are posed to him are narrow or leading, he will insure that other relevant questions--not necessarily posed by the policy tasking--are also included to insure that the Intelligence Community's answers appear in sufficiently broad context as to be fully representative of the intelligence problem.
 - The NIOs will be held strictly accountable to longstanding NIC insistence that policy level participation is to be excluded in drawing up the ultimate terms of reference, in the drafting of the Estimate, or in the coordination process.
- d. The coordination process, however, raises more complex issues. Each representative at a coordination meeting will inevitably have his own--usually unspoken--policy preferences; this is human nature. Also, one person's rigorously reasoned judgments may be another's policy preference. It is important that pure policy preferences play no part in the intelligence judgments reached at coordination.
- Several of the participating agencies however--INR and DIA in particular--are attached to larger institutions which do engage in the policy process. INR in particular routinely clears draft Estimates through the relevant policy bureaus for comment. This process does ensure that practical considerations of future diplomatic initiatives are brought to bear on the scenarios contemplated by the estimate. But we believe this process can also occasionally undermine the integrity and independence of the estimative process. Those

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agencies will need to undertake separate review of their own inhouse procedures. For their part, NIOs are to resist "intelligence" changes which other Agencies may offer, late in the process of producing an Estimate, in those cases where such changes obviously reflect the disgruntlement of policy offices within those Agencies--and except in case where additional intelligence data or legitimate new lines of intelligence inquiry or process are brought to hand.

- Senior review of draft estimates by the DCI, DDCI, C/NIC, VC/NIC, and the NIO himself, can involve some gray areas. These individuals in particular are closer to the policy process than are the intelligence analysts who draft the estimates and bring a different outlook to the intelligence process. Differing senses of international realities can often, even mistakenly, be identified as representing "politicization" of the process. The benefit of senior level critique of draft Estimates is that it often brings to bear a broader conceptual view of the nature of the international order and the character of international conflict. These views inevitably have direct impact on their assessment of the likelihood of certain kind of events taking place or not taking place. It is important for all of these individuals to distinguish between 1) legitimate critique of a narrow, ill-formed or naive conception of politics or the international order--which can lead to lack of perception in draft Estimates--and 2) the advocacy of preferred political views on how to deal with the nature of the international conflict. In short, the higher the level of generalization about how certain situations will evolve, the more one's own unspoken philosophical sense of how the world works is involved. Searching senior critiques of community estimative views need not represent "politicization" of the process. It would also be beneficial for other parts of CIA to be made aware of these considerations and distinctions at the top levels, and in the work of the NIC, so that there will not be mistaken, ill-informed views that "politicization" of the process takes place at the NIC and DCI levels.

[Redacted]
Frank B. Horton III

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H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

[Redacted]
Graham E. Fuller

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NIC 01753-87
20 April 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Response to NSDD 266 on the Implementation of the
Recommendations of the Tower Commission

NIC/C/VCs/FBHorton:HFHutchinson:GEFuller: 20 Apr. 87

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Distribution:

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**MEMORANDUM
OF CALL**

Previous editions usable

TO:

C/NIC



YOU WERE CALLED BY—



YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization)



PLEASE PHONE ►



FTS



AUTOVON



WILL CALL AGAIN



IS WAITING TO SEE YOU



RETURNED YOUR CALL



WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Re Gates' 27 April memo on Response to NSDD 266--refers in first line to memo you sent Gates. Can [] have a copy of your memo? I'm to mail to him, or WASHFAX it.

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO:		4/28
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	0835
<div data-bbox="472 1333 813 1520" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 210px; height: 89px; margin-bottom: 10px;"></div> <p style="margin-left: 100px;">Sent go ahead & send this out. It's just what Bob wants.</p>		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

28 Apr. 1987

ADCI

Bob - If this looks good
to you, I'll have []

[] send it out today.

V/R

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